

**The Late Augustine and Thomas Aquinas on Perseverance and the Lord's Prayer:
An examination of Augustine's influence on Thomas' understanding of the Lord's Prayer and
the Operative Grace of Perseverance.**

Thomas Aquinas' writings on Grace most especially trouble the hermeneutical categories of the contemporary dichotomy between systematic and historical theology. Reading Aquinas in light of such a distinction leads to an impoverishment of our appreciation for the evolution of his thought and his work as an historian. It seems that these two aspects of his thought, viz. its development and dependence on his historical study, are related insofar as his preoccupation with the latter was oftentimes the provocation for the former. In his writings on Grace in particular, three broad strains of development may be discerned between his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (*Scriptum*) (1252-1256) and his *Summa Theologiae* (*Summa*) (1265-1272): his teaching on conversion, merit, and perseverance. These developments were not without influence from authoritative texts, especially the late Augustine, occasioned by his work as an historian, as has been argued by H. Bouillard¹ and J. Wawrykow,² among others. These two scholars have established a method of inquiry regarding Thomas' development through actualizing a series of questions and providing a framework of sources with which to answer them. Some persistent questions which arise throughout these investigations are: (1) *What are the shifts in Aquinas' thought on Grace?* (2) *What are the sources which influenced such an evolution?* (3) *What other factors may underlie either the shifts themselves or the way in which*

¹ Bouillard, Henri. *Conversion et Grace chez S. Thomas D'Aquin* (Etudes publiees sous la direction de la faculte de theologie S. J. de Lyon-Fourviere. Paris: Aubier, 1941).

² Wawrykow, Joseph. *God's Grace & Human Action: 'Merit' in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).

those sources influenced him? (4) And in what way are these shifts reflected in or conjugated with respect to other areas of his thought?

With regard to Aquinas' teaching on conversion, one must turn to H. Bouillard's famous study, *Conversion et Grace chez S. Thomas D'Aquin*, which, on account of its scope, primarily concerns itself with the first three of these questions. For the first question, Bouillard offers a chronology which entails a study of the question of grace and conversion, specifically with regard to its prevenience (or lack thereof), in three phases: (1) the *Scriptum and De Veritate*, (2) the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (ScG), *Expositio in Epistula S. Pauli*, *Summa Ia Pars*, and *Quodlibet I*, and finally, (3) the *Summa II and II Pars* and *Expositio in Johnnam*. In a section entitled *Decouvertes*, Bouillard attempts to answer the second (and partly the third) of these questions by accounting for Thomas' development between the second and third phase of his works through positing his discovery of several sources during his trip to Orvieto in the 1260's, specifically two works from the late Augustine (*de praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *de dono perseverantiae*), the *Liber de Bona Fortuna*, and a few internal developments in Aquinas' thought. Bouillard's study, although not exempt from criticism, has proven to be of much value for contemporary scholarship. With respect to the question of conversion, Bouillard has left the third and fourth questions largely open for further inquiry; however, following his model of development and key insights regarding his answers to the first two questions, he has prompted others to continue this historical project as it pertains to Aquinas' teaching on merit and perseverance. With regard to Aquinas' teaching on merit, one must turn to J. Wawrykow's rewarding study, *God's Grace & Human Action: 'Merit' in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, in which he follows a similar methodology: first, he examines the early Aquinas in the *Scriptum and De Veritate*; second, he compares this with the developments found in the late Aquinas' *Summa*; and third, he offers

some reflective remarks regarding sources which account for the difference. In the first two sections, Wawrykow answers the first of our questions, and in the third section, he answers the second and third of our questions. These pieces of scholarship provide a sound methodological framework within which to approach Thomas' development on grace.

While their contributions are incontrovertible, and in many cases foundational, the scholarship in general has largely neglected the specific evolution on his teaching on the grace of perseverance. In the last two decades, a few works have appeared, one of which was authored by J. Wawrykow, who implemented this same methodological framework in broad strokes in order to contextualize Aquinas' teaching on perseverance. It is the purpose of this essay to examine the late Augustine and Aquinas on the Lord's Prayer and the grace of perseverance within this methodological framework in an attempt to further the project of filling this lacuna in the scholarship. I shall attempt to answer those four questions with respect to the grace of perseverance, with the benefit of examining its connection to the Lord's prayer specifically which will help answer the third and fourth of our questions by demonstrating the relationship between Thomas' work as a systematician, church historian, and biblical exegete. In broad strokes, the theses I am setting forth could best be understood within this methodological framework:

(1) *What are the shifts in Aquinas' thought on the grace of perseverance?* In the *Scriptum*, as with most scholastics, perseverance was understood as the personal good use of habitual grace. Perseverance required habitual grace as the condition of its possibility, but its nearest source is the wayfarer (*viator*), whose obligation it is to make good use of the habitual grace that has been bestowed on him or her by God (as the penultimate source, as it were, of perseverance). When we compare this understanding to Thomas' *Summa*, we find that his

thought has not only developed, but that he largely rejects this earlier position. Perseverance for the late Aquinas is understood within the context of the operative grace of *auxilia* and, therefore, as only attributable to God. This stark contrast between the early and late Aquinas offers sufficient provocation for implementing Bouillard and Wawrykow's methodological framework for further inquiry. In this essay, I shall examine four of Aquinas' works as providing the parameters for the examination of the progressive relationship between his teaching on perseverance and his reading and use of the Lord's Prayer: (1) the *Scriptum*, (2) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, (3) *Catena Aurea*, and (4) *the Summa*.

(2) *What are the sources which influenced such an evolution?* As outlined in H. Bouillard and J. Wawrykow's works, the discovery of the late Augustine during his stay in Orvieto proved influential. I shall examine discuss Patout Burn's authoritative treatment³ of Augustine's writings on grace. Further, I shall offer an analysis of Augustine's use of perseverance and the Lord's prayer in four of his late works: (1) *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, (2) *De correptione et gratia*, (3) *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, (4) *Do dono perseverantiae*. It was only the last two of these against the so-called semi-Pelagians (Massilians) that had lost currency after the 9th century until their rediscovery by Thomas (and others) in the 13th century. In light of these last two, Aquinas' use and implementation of even the former two was changed on account of his new understanding of perseverance. In his pre-discovery writings, he uses the two former works as supportive of his thought; while in his post-discovery writings, he understands and uses those same former two to support his later position – a position which he would consider to be incompatible with his earlier one – on account of his reading of the last two works. These works

³ Burns, J. Patout. *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1980).

in themselves, however, can neither account for the way in which they influenced him, nor the way in which he implemented or interpreted them. As argued by C. A. Gorman and J. Wawrykow,⁴ the case of Matthew of Aquasparta, who also had discovered and used these late works of Augustine, demonstrates familiarity with the late Augustinian texts in isolation from other factors does not *de ipso facto* produce the mature Aquinas' teaching. For while Matthew of Aquasparta may have been influenced by Augustine insofar as to posit that the grace of conversion is entirely unmerited and worked by God, he persisted in the common scholastic understanding of perseverance, such as Aquinas had in the *Scriptum*. The question regarding the distinction between Aquinas and Matthew's reading of Augustine leads us to our third question.

(3) *What other factors may underlie either the shifts themselves or the way in which those sources influenced him?* The question of whether the Augustinian texts prompted the shifts or were conditioned by certain internal shifts in Aquinas' thought is, at best, difficult and, at worst, circular. The hermeneutic by which it seems best to proceed is to posit the net change between his last pre-discovery treatment of perseverance and his post-discovery treatment in the *Summa* as the criterion for explanation. This should be followed by a close comparison of the Augustinian contribution to that criterion. Even if the teaching in Augustine's late works and the criterion of net change prove to be commensurable, the case of Matthew of Aquasparta, and as we shall see, the pre-discovery development within Aquinas, prove that the condition of the

⁴ Gorman, Cyril Anthony. *Augustine and high medieval theologies of perseverance: the "perseverance" teachings of Augustine, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Matthew of Aquasparta and Gregory of Rimini*. (Notre Dame: Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2005); and Wawrykow, Joseph. "'Perseverance' in the 13th-Century Theology: the Augustinian Contribution," in *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991): 125-141.

possibility for such an integration of the Augustinian contribution rests within a trajectory of movement in Thomas' own thought. Beyond the specific teachings on conversion, merit, and perseverance, the writings of the late Augustine left Aquinas with three key influences, which Augustine had himself developed within the late portion of his career:

- (i) a deepening sense of sin and its effects (even after conversion)
- (ii) grace increasingly seen as inward and transformational (and not just exterior)
- (iii) increased reference and contextualization to predestination (in a causal sense).

These three realizations, perhaps more important than the specifics of Augustine's teaching on conversion, merit, and perseverance, impacted the late Aquinas. For, Aquinas not only absorbed the Augustinian conclusions, as it were, into his teaching on grace, but integrated these underlying realizations into his understanding of the Christian faith, which led him to reflect or conjugate them in other areas of his thought. The permeation throughout his works of the impact that his reading of Augustine had attests to the fact that this reading must be contextualized within a broader framework of Thomistic development, much of which is prompted by and reflected in his Biblical exegesis.

(4) And in what way are these shifts reflected in or conjugated with respect to other areas of his thought? Even in the Augustinian works available to the pre-discovery Aquinas, there was a correlation between the former's teaching on perseverance and the Lord's Prayer. While the teaching on perseverance was slight in these early Augustinian works by comparison to the two that were discovered, the relationship between the Lord's Prayer and perseverance even in the pre-discovery works available to Thomas can account for the explicit development in the pre-discovery Thomas between the *Scriptum* and the *ScG* in which he moves from no relation between the Lord's Prayer and perseverance in the former to a complete identification between them in the latter. As his interpretation of Augustine shifted in light of his discovery of these

later works, so did his understanding of the meaning and significance of the Lord's Prayer, as it was used in those late works of Augustine. This development of both, his reading of the earlier writings of Augustine on grace and his understanding of the Lord's Prayer in connection with perseverance, is reflected in his post-discovery treatments, such as in the *Catena Aurea* and the *Summa*.

Within the above methodological framework, my survey shall implement several questions as a heuristic device to more clearly discern the pattern of his development: *What is his teaching on perseverance? How seriously does he take sin, both before and after the gift of grace? Is perseverance to be attributed to the good work and effort of the human who has been infused with habitual grace or to God as a gift above and beyond habitual grace? If the latter, then is this additional gift external through Providence, internal through auxilia, or both? And, what is his use of the Lord's Prayer in connection with his teaching on perseverance?* I shall first survey his two pre-discovery works (the *Scriptum* and the *ScG*), then examine four of Augustine's anti-Pelagian works (*De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *De correptione et gratia*, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, *De dono perseverantiae*), followed by an examination of two of Thomas' post-discovery writings (*Catena Aurea* and the *Summa*).

I. The *Scriptum* (1252-1256): Pre-Discovery Aquinas (1)

While Aquinas was at the University of Paris, he acquired his *Bachelor* through his *Commentary* on Peter Lombard's sentences. They had been introduced by Alexander of Hales as the standard teaching curriculum since roughly the time of Aquinas' birth.⁵ There are several places in which the Lombard treats questions pertaining to Grace. With the exception of a few

⁵ O'Meara, Thomas F., *Thomas Aquinas: Theologian* (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN 1997) 13.

references in Bk III (cf. the question of Ancients meriting the Incarnation, disp. 4, Quaest. 3) and Bk IV (cf. the issue of punishment and merit, disp. 15, Quaest 1), the most relevant and sustained treatment may be found in Book II, wherein he treats *On Creation*. The treatment of perseverance within the *Scriptum* is slight, but sufficient to re-construct in broad strokes his teaching. Thomas invokes the term “perseverance” (or one of its cognates) eight times in this book,⁶ none of which are associated with the Lord’s prayer, pieces of which are only cited three

⁶ I used the Index Thomisticum to search for “*Perseverentia*” or any of its cognates within the *Scriptum*. The following eight cases are all of its uses in this work: **Case 1. *Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 4 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1.*** [...] ¹ Videtur quod Angeli creati sint beati. Primo per Augustinum in Lib. de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, qui dicit quod Angeli qui in illa in qua sunt creati beatitudine **perseverant**, non natura, sed gratia possident ut non mutantur. Sed Angeli boni, de quibus loquitur, perseverant in beatitudine perfectae gloriae. [...]; **Case 2. *Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 4 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1.*** [...] ² Primo per Augustinum in Lib. de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, qui dicit quod Angeli qui in illa in qua sunt creati beatitudine perseverant, non natura, sed gratia possident ut non mutantur. Sed Angeli boni, de quibus loquitur, **perseverant** in beatitudine perfectae gloriae. Ergo videtur quod in illa creati sint; **Case 3. *Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 26 q. 1 a. 5 co.*** [...] ⁸ Uno modo ut per gratiam operantem significetur ipsa gratia, prout esse divinum in anima operatur, secundum quod gratum facit habentem; et per gratiam cooperantem significetur ipsa gratia secundum quod opus meritorium causat, prout opus hominis gratum reddit. Alio modo secundum quod gratia operans dicitur, prout causat voluntatis actum; et cooperans secundum quod causat exteriorem actum in quo voluntas completur, per **perseverantiam** in illo. Et utroque modo cooperans et operans dicitur idem quod praeveniens et subsequens ; **Case 4. *Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 29 q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2.*** Praeterea, **perseverantia** quaedam virtus est, quam multi post peccati statum habent. Haec autem Adae defuit, ut ejus casus ostendit. [...]; **Case 5. *Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 29 q. 1 a. 3 ad 2.*** Ad secundum dicendum, quod **perseverantia** dupliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo est specialis virtus, cujus actus est habere propositum semper in bono permanendi; et talem virtutem Adam habuit et multi qui post corruerunt. [...]; **Case 6. *Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 29 q. 1 a. 3 ad 2.*** [...] ¹ Uno enim modo est specialis virtus, cujus actus est habere propositum semper in bono permanendi; et talem virtutem Adam habuit et multi qui post corruerunt. Alio modo est quaedam circumstantia consequens virtutes alias; et sic non ponit specialem virtutem, sed continuationem quamdam

times.⁷ In this early stage, Thomas understood grace exclusively as habitual grace, as did most of his scholastic contemporaries. The question of grace and its infusion was primarily contextualized within the framework of the ontological gap, rather than moral gap, between humans and God. As such, the question of perseverance, which presupposes the context of one's

virtutis usque ad mortem; et sic Adam in primo statu **perseverantiam** non habuit; *Case 7. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 43 q. 1 a. 3 ad 3.* Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut **perseverantia** dicitur dupliciter; uno enim modo est virtus specialis, prout dicit propositum perseverandi in bono incepto usque ad finem; et alio modo est circumstantia aliarum virtutum, prout dicit actualem durationem in actibus virtutum usque ad mortem; ita etiam et impenitentia, secundum quod dicit propositum non poenitendi, est species peccati in spiritum sanctum; secundum autem quod dicit permanentiam in peccato usque ad mortem, negando peccati poenitentiam, sic est accidens vel circumstantia aliorum peccatorum; *Case 8. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 43 q. 1 a. 3 ad 3.* Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut perseverantia dicitur dupliciter; uno enim modo est virtus specialis, prout dicit propositum **perseverandi** in bono incepto usque ad finem; et alio modo est circumstantia aliarum virtutum, prout dicit actualem durationem in actibus virtutum usque ad mortem; ita etiam et impenitentia, secundum quod dicit propositum non poenitendi, est species peccati in spiritum sanctum; secundum autem quod dicit permanentiam in peccato usque ad mortem, negando peccati poenitentiam, sic est accidens vel circumstantia aliorum peccatorum.

⁷ *Case 1. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 24 q. 3 a. 6 expos.* [...] ¹ Videtur hoc esse contra illud quod prius determinatum est. Quia percussio pectoris, et **pater noster**, valent ad dimissionem peccati venialis, et est satisfactio propria venialium. Ergo videtur quod morosa delectatio, de qua hic loquitur, sit veniale peccatum. [...] ; *Case 2. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 24 q. 3 a. 6 expos.* [...] ³ Ergo videtur quod morosa delectatio, de qua hic loquitur, sit veniale peccatum. Et dicendum, quod quamvis huiusmodi sit sufficiens satisfactio pro veniali peccato, et non pro mortali, tamen etiam ad dimissionem peccati mortalis valent; unde etiam pro mortalibus **pater noster** dicere debemus, et pectus tundere. Non enim ratio nostra deduci ad consensum peccati potest, nisi cum delectatio mota fuerit. [...]; *Case 1. Place 1. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 21 q. 1 a. 3 s.c. 1.* Sed contra illud quod debemus orare, debemus desiderare. Sed dominus Matth. 6, 13, docet nos orare, dicens: et ne **nos inducas** in tentationem. Ergo debemus desiderare tentationes a nobis removeri.

encounter with sin even after grace, was largely overlooked. Perseverance was seen as something that was in *our* power by virtue of the infusion of habitual grace. In other words, given that the infusion of habitual grace was from God (whether or not one could preveniently “merit” this infusion), it was up to the wayfarer to work in accordance with the precepts of the faith so as to persevere unto God as beatifying end. This formulation presupposes several things: (1) that grace is habitual; that is, that as a habit, it disposes someone to act a certain way, and those acts are subsequently within the scope of that person’s potential;⁸ (2) that perseverance is determined by the choices and works of the one who has been infused with habitual grace, thereby making the question of one’s perseverance unto God as beatifying end most nearly dependent upon the wayfarer; and (3) this presupposes that habitual grace provides sufficient capability in the one in whom it is infused for the working of charity and the avoidance of temptation, thereby implying a certain understanding regarding the “remnants of sin,” even post-conversion; and (4) as compared to Thomas’ later development regarding the threefold division of human action into (a) intent, (b) choice of means, and (c) execution,⁹ this understanding of perseverance would

⁸ Cf. J. Wawrykow, ‘Perseverance’ in *13th-Century Theology: the Augustinian Contribution*, 127-128 and fn. 8.

⁹ Cf. J. Wawrykow’s note regarding the development of Thomas’ understanding of the human will from the time of the *Scriptum* to the *Summa*, in his *God’s Grace & Human Action*, p. 64 fn 11. Also cf. Lonergan, Bernard. *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. (Canada: Lonergan Research Institute: University of Toronto Press, 2005), in which he surveys not only the development of Aquinas’ view of operative grace, but also his understanding of the human will throughout his career. In his later stage, as in the *Summa*, Thomas will posit that the intent was formed by an operative grace of *auxilia*, and the choice of means and execution were formed through a cooperative grace of *auxilia*, thereby making *auxilia* – and not habitual grace – the most proximate condition of the possibility for perseverance in the wayfarer (*viator*).

relegate all three of those to the power and proper “domain,” as it were, of the wayfarer after the infusion of habitual grace.

Thomas’ use of the Lord’s prayer occurs in two places. First in his treatment of *Distinction 24*, Question 3, Article 6, in which he offers an exposition of this article. He invokes the title of the Lord’s prayer with regard to the question of its relation to sin, especially regarding the diminution of sin and the use of this prayer. He writes that “*Quia percussio pectoris, et pater noster, valent ad dimissionem peccati venialis, et est satisfactio propria venialium.*” In continuing the question of the use of this prayer to offer satisfaction for venial sins, he writes, “*Et dicendum, quod quamvis huiusmodi sit sufficiens satisfactio pro veniali peccato, et non pro mortali, tamen etiam ad dimissionem peccati mortalis valent; unde etiam pro mortalibus pater noster dicere debemus, et pectus tundere.*”¹⁰ The second of his treatments occurs in his treatment

¹⁰ The entire passage of the *Expositio Textus* is: *Scriptum. Bk II, dist XXIV, Quaest. 3, a. 6: Et ideo de talibus cogitationibus venia petenda est. Videtur hoc esse contra illud quod prius determinatum est. Quia percussio pectoris, et pater noster, valent ad dimissionem peccati venialis, et est satisfactio propria venialium. Ergo videtur quod morosa delectatio, de qua hic loquitur, sit veniale peccatum. Et dicendum, quod quamvis huiusmodi sit sufficiens satisfactio pro veniali peccato, et non pro mortali, tamen etiam ad dimissionem peccati mortalis valent; unde etiam pro mortalibus pater noster dicere debemus, et pectus tundere. Non enim ratio nostra deduci ad consensum peccati potest, nisi cum delectatio mota fuerit. Videtur hoc esse falsum; quia quaedam peccata spiritualia sunt, in quibus non est aliqua carnis delectatio. Sed dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur in genere peccatorum carnalium, quorum appetitus ad sensualitatem pertinet. Non est autem silentio praetereundum, quod saepe in Scriptura nomine sensualitatis (...) etiam inferior portio rationis (...) intelligitur. Hic per Scripturas, non canonem Bibliae, sed dicta sanctorum significat. Ratio autem dicti est propter convenientiam sensualitatis et inferioris rationis; quia utraque attendit ea quae ad corpus pertinent, licet ratio inferior sub rationibus universalibus, et sensualitas sub rationibus particularibus et materiae concretis. Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia Textum Parmae 1856 editum ac automato translatus a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit,*

On the devil's envy, by which he came to tempt, in which we pray the Lord's Prayer, specifically "and do not lead us into temptation," since we ought to desire and pray for the temptation of the devil to be removed from us.¹¹ In light of the above discussion on perseverance, one must remember with regard to the devil's temptations: (1) that the ability to avoid the devil's temptations fall within the power of the one in whom habitual grace has been infused; and (2) that our prayer to avoid temptation does not convey, as it will for the late Aquinas, the idea of perseverance as a gift from God; rather, the verse is only used to disclose a proper orientation and action towards attaining a certain good that falls within the scope of the wayfarer's grace-infused potency.

II. *Summa Contra Gentiles* (1259-1265): Pre-/ During-Discovery Aquinas (2)

In the aftermath of Aquinas' *bachelor* at the University of Paris, during which he composed the *Scriptum*, he taught as a Master of Theology between 1256-1259.¹² He then lived in Naples between 1259-1261, followed by his stay in Orvieto from 1261-1265. Orvieto proved not only to be influential, but decisive in Aquinas' career and intellectual development. It was during this stay that he wrote his *Summa contra Gentiles* (more fully known as the *Tractatus de fide catholica, contra Gentiles [contra errores infidelium]*), which was completed by 1265. By

Scriptum super Sententiis [henceforth, *Super Sent.* or *Scriptum*]; on-line at <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/iopera.html> (accessed October 1, 2010).

¹¹ *Super Sent.*, lib. 2 d. 21 q. 1 a. 3 s.c. 1. Sed contra illud quod debemus orare, debemus desiderare. Sed dominus Matth. 6, 13, docet nos orare, dicens: et ne **nos inducas** in tentationem. Ergo debemus desiderare tentationes a nobis removeri.

¹² For this portion and the rest of the historical narrative, see: T. F. O'Meara, OP. *Thomas Aquinas: Theologian*; Torrell, Jean-Pierre. *Saint Thomas Aquinas*. (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1996).

this date he had already discovered the late writings of Augustine and composed the first portion of his *Catena Aurea*, on the Gospel of Matthew, in which he incorporated those discovered writings. This commentary on the Gospel of Matthew is reputed to have been offered to Pope Urban IV before his death on October 2, 1262, offering us a *terminus ante quem* for this discovery. The question of the relationship between his composition of those writings on grace in particular and this discovery is not currently answerable; and the question of the degree to which he was able to reflect upon and internalize these writings, if he had by then already discovered them, so as to incorporate them into his thought while writings the *ScG* is difficult, if not impossible to answer with certainty. We do see a notable shift between the *Scriptum* and the *ScG* with respect to perseverance and his use of the Lord's Prayer (henceforth termed "the first shift"); and correspondingly, we also see a shift, albeit slighter, from his treatment in the *ScG* to the *Summa* in both of those areas ("the second shift"). It seems that the first shift is more characteristic of the teaching that one finds in Augustine's earlier and middle works on grace, wherein perseverance was deemed necessary and from God, but was construed as external and providentially guided, than the second shift which reflects Augustine's later works in which the grace of perseverance is seen as internal and transformative. While there may be an increase in his conscientiousness of the reality of sin in the second shift, that increase is much slighter than that of the first shift. In the *ScG*, Aquinas treats the issue of perseverance in four questions, in three of which he cites the Lord's prayer, thus moving towards a fuller integration of the Lord's prayer with his teaching on perseverance. In fact, this movement towards association of the Lord's Prayer with his teaching on perseverance is so notable that those three are the *only* citations of the Lord's Prayer in the entire work.

In his first use of perseverance and the Lord's Prayer (ch. 155), he treats the proposition "that man needs the help of grace to persevere in the good." Thomas here argues that divine grace is needed for the human to persevere unto God as beatifying end. His argument largely revolves around the nature of human willing: a human can will and do something here and now, he or she can choose how an operation can be performed; however, this human willing is subject to fluctuation, and as such, has two things which are beyond its capacity: (1) the ability to will to continue to will good in the future, since our willing is always limited by the "here and now";¹³ (2) the ability to continue an operation throughout time, when our ability to operate is conditioned by time and circumstances;¹⁴ and (3) since the end towards which we are oriented is

¹³ Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *Tractatus de fide catholica, contra Gentiles [contra errores infidelium]*, [henceforth, *Contra Gentiles* or *ScG*] (Textum Leoninum emendatum ex plagulis de prelo Taurini 1961 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit; on-line at <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html> (accessed October 1, 2010). *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 155: Omne enim quod de se est variabile, ad hoc quod figatur in uno, indiget auxilio alicuius moventis immobilis. Homo autem variabilis est et de malo in bonum, et de bono in malum. Ad hoc igitur quod immobiliter perseveret in bono, quod est perseverare, indiget auxilio divino; *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 155 n. 3 *Adhuc*. Ad illud quod excedit vires liberi arbitrii, indiget homo auxilio divinae gratiae. Sed virtus liberi arbitrii non se extendit ad hunc effectum qui est perseverare finaliter in bono. Quod sic patet. Potestas enim liberi arbitrii est respectu eorum quae sub electione cadunt. Quod autem eligitur, est aliquod particulare operabile. Particulare autem operabile est quod est hic et nunc. Quod igitur cadit sub potestate liberi arbitrii, est aliquid ut nunc operandum. Perseverare autem non dicit aliquid ut nunc operabile, sed continuationem operationis per totum tempus. Iste igitur effectus qui est perseverare in bono, est supra potestatem liberi arbitrii. Indiget igitur homo ad perseverandum in bono auxilio divinae gratiae.

¹⁴ *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 155 n. 3 *Adhuc*. Ad illud quod excedit vires liberi arbitrii, indiget homo auxilio divinae gratiae. Sed virtus liberi arbitrii non se extendit ad hunc effectum qui est perseverare finaliter in bono. Quod sic patet. Potestas enim liberi arbitrii est respectu eorum quae sub electione cadunt. Quod autem eligitur, est aliquod

given to us by God, the entire movement of ascertaining that end must be contextualized within the orientation given by God, and therefore considered a divine grace.¹⁵ Aquinas then posits that in Scripture there are many prayers in which perseverance is sought from God:

particulare operabile. Particulare autem operabile est quod est hic et nunc. Quod igitur cadit sub potestate liberi arbitrii, est aliquid ut nunc operandum. Perseverare autem non dicit aliquid ut nunc operabile, sed continuationem operationis per totum tempus. Iste igitur effectus qui est perseverare in bono, est supra potestatem liberi arbitrii. Indiget igitur homo ad perseverandum in bono auxilio divinae gratiae. *Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 155 n. 4*

Amplius. Licet homo per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium sit dominus sui actus, non tamen est dominus suarum naturalium potentiarum. Et ideo, licet liber sit ad volendum vel ad non volendum aliquid, non tamen volendo facere potest quod voluntas in eo quod vult, ad id quod vult vel eligit immobiliter se habeat. Hoc autem requiritur ad perseverantiam: ut scilicet voluntas in bono immobiliter permaneat. Perseverantia igitur non est in potestate liberi arbitrii. Oportet igitur adesse homini auxilium divinae gratiae ad hoc ut perseveret; *Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 155 n. 5 Praeterea.* Si sunt plura agentia successive, quorum scilicet unum agat post actionem alterius; continuas actionis istorum non potest causari ex aliquo uno ipsorum, quia nullum eorum semper agit; nec ex omnibus, quia non simul agunt; unde oportet quod causetur ab aliquo superiori quod semper agit: sicut philosophus probat, in VIII Phys., quod continuas generationis in animalibus causatur ab aliquo superiori sempiterno. Ponamus autem aliquem perseverantem in bono. In eo igitur sunt multi motus liberi arbitrii tendentes in bonum, sibi invicem succedentes usque ad finem. Huius igitur continuationis boni, quod est perseverantia, non potest esse causa aliquis istorum motuum: quia nullus eorum semper durat. Nec omnes simul: quia non simul sunt, non possunt igitur simul aliquid causare. Relinquitur ergo quod ista continuatio causetur ab aliquo superiori. Indiget igitur homo auxilio superioris gratiae ad perseverandum in bono.

¹⁵ *Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 155 n. 4 Amplius.* Licet homo per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium sit dominus sui actus, non tamen est dominus suarum naturalium potentiarum. Et ideo, licet liber sit ad volendum vel ad non volendum aliquid, non tamen volendo facere potest quod voluntas in eo quod vult, ad id quod vult vel eligit immobiliter se habeat. Hoc autem requiritur ad perseverantiam: ut scilicet voluntas in bono immobiliter permaneat. Perseverantia igitur non est in potestate liberi arbitrii. Oportet igitur adesse homini auxilium divinae gratiae ad hoc

This is also what is asked in the Lord's Prayer, especially when one says, "Thy kingdom come"; indeed, the kingdom of God will not come for us unless we have persevered in the good. Now it would be ridiculous to ask something from God if He were not the giver of it. So, man's perseverance is from God. By this we set aside the error of the Pelagians, who said that free choice is sufficient for man to persevere in the good, and that he does not need the help of grace for this purpose.¹⁶

In the *Scriptum*, grace was exclusively seen as habitual. The question with regard to this treatment is: how does he understand the grace of perseverance? Thomas intimates us as he continues to write,

However, we should note that even he who possesses grace asks God that he may persevere in the good. *Just as free choice is not sufficient without the external help of God, for this effect of persevering in the good, so neither is a habit infused in us enough for this purpose.* For habits that are divinely infused in us during the present state of life do not take away entirely from free choice the possibility of being moved toward evil, even though free choice is somewhat fixed in the good by means of them. *And so, when we say that man needs the help of grace to persevere unto the end, we do not understand that, in addition to habitual grace previously infused to assure good operation, another must further be infused for*

ut perseveret. *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 155 n. 6 Item. Si sint multa ordinata ad unum finem, totus ordo eorum quousque pervenerint ad finem, est a primo agente dirigente in finem. In eo autem qui perseverat in bono, sunt multi motus et multae actiones pertingentes ad unum finem. Oportet igitur quod totus ordo istorum motuum et actionum causetur a primo dirigente in finem. Ostensum est autem quod per auxilium divinae gratiae diriguntur in ultimum finem. Igitur per auxilium divinae gratiae est totus ordo et continuatio bonorum operum in eo qui perseverat in bono.

¹⁶ The translation used in this essay is: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Translated by Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 155 n. 8 Inveniuntur etiam in sacra Scriptura multae orationes quibus a Deo petitur perseverantia Hoc etiam ipsum in oratione dominica petitur, maxime cum dicitur, *adveniat regnum tuum*: non enim nobis adveniet regnum Dei nisi in bono fuerimus perseverantes. Derisorium autem esset aliquid a Deo petere cuius ipse dator non esset. Est igitur perseverantia hominis a Deo; emphasis added.

*persevering; what we do understand is that, once possessed of all the gratuitous habits, a man still needs the help of divine providence externally governing him.*¹⁷

A few things must be noted regarding this chapter (155) when compared with his teaching in the *Scriptum*: (1) Aquinas continues to maintain that grace is primarily habitual; (2) even if he now posits that there is some other indeterminate grace, he describes it not as something which moves the will or is *internally* infused (such as habitual grace) to assure perseverance, but as the help of divine providence *externally* governing him; (3) there is the recognition that within the life of grace, there is still the possibility of turning to evil, wherefore we require perseverance; and (4) he seems to have developed a deeper understanding of causality between God and humans with respect to grace. This last point can most notably be seen in his use of causal categories for explaining the dynamics of human intention, willing, and performance, in regard to God's will of himself for us as supernatural end.

In his next chapter (156), he frames the question regarding those who fall from grace through sin but are restored through grace in terms of perseverance. The petitions in the Lord's Prayer that request our forgiveness, "*et dimitte nobis debita nostra*," disclose the possibility of reconciliation with God, even after one sins. Thomas relates this to his understanding of

¹⁷ *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 155 n. 10: Sciendum tamen est quod, cum etiam ille qui gratiam habet, petat a Deo ut perseveret in bono; sicut liberum arbitrium non sufficit ad istum effectum qui est perseverare in bono, sine exteriori Dei auxilio, ita nec ad hoc sufficit aliquis habitus nobis infusus. Habitus enim qui nobis infunduntur divinitus, secundum statum praesentis vitae, non auferunt a libero arbitrio totaliter mobilitatem ad malum: licet per eos liberum arbitrium aliquantulum stabiliatur in bono. Et ideo, cum dicimus hominem indigere ad perseverandum finaliter auxilio gratiae, non intelligimus quod, super gratiam habitualement prius infusam ad bene operandum, alia desuper infundatur ad perseverandum: sed intelligimus quod, habitis omnibus habitibus gratuitis, adhuc indiget homo divinae providentiae auxilio exterius gubernantis; emphasis added.

perseverance insofar as perseverance is dependent upon God, and as such, is always possible so long as the person is alive. Thomas intimates the means by which this reconciliation is possible: through the re-infusion of habitual grace and through the external circumstances described in Ch. 155.¹⁸ In one place, however, Thomas hints at the possibility that God, who is supreme cause, could move one's potential to act,¹⁹ thereby including God not only within the process of infusing humans with an elevated capacity for meritorious acts of virtue, but bringing them to actualization. Nevertheless, this was only a passing comment, and does not receive fuller attention until his development of the operative and co-operative grace of *auxilium* in the *Summa*.

Thomas briefly mentions the idea of perseverance when treating the proposition "that it is reasonable to hold a man responsible if he does not turn toward God, even though he cannot do this without grace," (Ch. 159). While this is the only reference to perseverance that does not cite the Lord's Prayer, it is important to note two things: (1) he contextualizes perseverance as a grace only given by God and as something which is needed to work towards God as ultimate end:

¹⁸ Cf. *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 156 n. 5 *Item*. Gratia est quaedam habitualis dispositio in anima, ut ostensum est. Sed habitus acquisiti per actus, si amittantur, possunt iterum reacquiri per actus per quos acquisiti sunt. Multo igitur magis gratia Deo coniungens et a peccato liberans, si amittatur, divina operatione reparari potest.

¹⁹ *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 156 n. 7 *Amplius*. Nulla potentia passiva invenitur in rerum natura quae non possit reduci in actum per aliquam potentiam activam naturalem. Multo igitur minus est aliqua potentia in anima humana quae non sit reducibilis in actum per potentiam activam divinam. Manet autem in anima humana, etiam post peccatum potentia ad bonum: quia per peccatum non tolluntur potentiae naturales, quibus anima ordinatur ad suum bonum. Potest igitur per divinam potentiam reparari in bono. Et sic auxilio gratiae homo potest consequi remissionem peccatorum.

As we gather from the foregoing, since one cannot be directed to the ultimate end except by means of divine grace, without which no one can possess the things needed to work toward the ultimate end, such as faith, hope, love, and perseverance, it might seem to some person that man should not be held responsible for the lack of such aids.²⁰

And (2) that those who do not receive such grace, either of conversion or of perseverance, can be held accountable because we are able to prevent ourselves from receiving grace:

Although one may neither merit in advance nor call forth divine grace by a movement of his free choice, he is able to prevent himself from receiving this grace.²¹

In comparing this portion of his treatment with the *Summa*, and with the late Augustine, one finds that regarding the first, the means by which that grace is given is not exclusively through *external* circumstances controlled by providence, but through the *internal* grace of *auxilia*; and regarding the second, Aquinas (and Augustine) would answer such a question by positing a deeper realization of sin, especially original sin, in which all were condemned in Adam, as sufficient explanation for exculpating God, while also affirming the irresistibility and absolute effectiveness of grace.

In his final treatment of perseverance and use of the Lord's Prayer (Ch. 160), he addresses the proposition "that man in the state of sin, without grace, cannot avoid sin." His contention here is that habitual grace orients one towards good actions; the loss of that grace

²⁰ *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 159 n. 1. Cum autem, sicut ex praemissis habetur, in finem ultimum aliquis dirigi non possit nisi auxilio divinae gratiae; sine qua etiam nullus potest habere ea quae sunt necessaria ad tendendum in ultimum finem, sicut est fides, spes, dilectio, et perseverantia; potest alicui videri quod non sit homini imputandum si praedictis careat

²¹ *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 159 n. 2. Ad huius dubitationis solutionem considerandum est quod, licet aliquis per motum liberi arbitrii divinam gratiam nec promereri nec advocari possit, potest tamen seipsum impedire ne eam recipiat

leaves us with not only a lack of a good orientation, but one which is precisely the contrary. This leads him to consider the opinion “of the Pelagians,” who said that “man in the state of sin is able to avoid sin, without grace.”²² He finds the petition of the Lord’s Prayer, “And lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil,” to indicate that it is God who gratuitously bestows conversion and perseverance on otherwise unmerited recipients, whose fall from grace, if it occurs, would be their own fault since conversion and grace are both undeserved in the first place.²³

The ScG seems to exemplify three important points for the purpose of our project: (1) a close identification between the Lord’s Prayer and the grace of perseverance; (2) the teaching that perseverance is necessary for attaining to God as beatifying end; (3) that wayfarers, even after the infusion of habitual grace, are liable to temptation and may be turned to an evil will; (4) that perseverance is a gift from God; (5) that it is not habitual grace, nor is it something infused in addition to habitual grace; and (6) that the grace of perseverance is offered through the external guidance of God’s providence. In relation to Augustine’s late writings on grace, it seems that this position lacks the deeper understanding of the reality of sin, the internal or transformative character of the grace of perseverance, and the irresistibility of grace and therefore contextualization of perseverance in terms of the predestination of the saints, rather

²² *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 160 n. 4. Unde apparet stulta Pelagianorum opinio, qui dicebant hominem in peccato existentem sine gratia posse vitare peccata. Cuius contrarium apparet ex hoc quod Psalmus petit: *dum defecerit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me*. Et dominus orare nos docet: *et ne nos inducas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo*.

²³ *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 160 n. 5. Quamvis autem illi qui in peccato sunt, vitare non possint per propriam potestatem quin impedimentum gratiae ponant, ut ostensum est, nisi auxilio gratiae praeveniantur; nihilominus tamen hoc eis imputatur ad culpam, quia hic defectus ex culpa praecedente in eis relinquitur; sicut ebrius ab homicidio non excusatur quod per ebrietatem committit, quam sua culpa incurrit.

than one's resistibility to grace's efficacy. If Aquinas had read the works of Augustine by this point, he had not absorbed or appropriated those features of these works, as he will in the *Summa*. It is possible that he had read them, as did Matthew of Aquasparta, and only implemented a certain portion of them until he was able to further contextualize them in connection with the broader trajectory of his thought. However, I consider it to be more likely that at the point of this composition, he was only (or more predominately) exposed to Augustine's earlier writings on grace, in which these features are less prominent, than those of the anti-Massilian brand. As noted by Patout Burns and J. Wawrykow, Augustine had affirmed in writings earlier than *de dono perseverantiae* and *de praedestinatione Sanctorum* an operative grace of *conversion* tied to predestination; but it was only in the writings after 426 – that is, those two works, plus *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* and *De Correptione et Gratia* – that Augustine had attained to the additional insight about an operative grace that works perseverance.²⁴ This suggestion is tentative, but can only be sustained in light of a fuller account of the development in Augustine's teaching on grace, and therefore, the different possible sources of influence at Aquinas' disposal.

III. Augustine on Perseverance and the Lord's Prayer: The Principal Developments

Much like Aquinas, Augustine's teaching on grace underwent development.²⁵ In his famous and authoritative study, *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace*,

²⁴ J. Wawrykow, *God's Grace & Human Action: 'Merit' in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, 272.

²⁵ There are several great studies of Augustine's anti-Pelagian controversy and theology of grace, such as Ogliari, D. *Gratia et Certamen: The Relationship between Grace and Free-Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the so-called Semipelagians* (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium CLXIX. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003); and Studer, Basil. *The Grace of Christ and the Grace of God in Augustine of Hippo: Christocentrism*

P. Burns outlines three broad stages of development. The first stage, from 326 on, has three distinctive features: (1) the starting point in the human person is the desire for the good, for completing in God; (2) God's grace is seen as working through the circumstances in one's life, and therefore, as external; and (3) he does not discuss predestination; rather, God's congruous call (at best). The second stage, from 412 on (especially after 418), against the Pelagians, clearly designates a double starting point: predestination (to conversion) and original sin /inclination to sin when the will is exercised, which includes the hardening of the heart. In this rendition, grace is seen as inward and transforming, and it works conversion. While one may be called to conversion, Augustine still nonetheless sees our ability to remain in the state of grace as something which is left to our good use of grace, much like Aquinas' position in the *Scriptum* with regard to perseverance. These two phases, though, share two important features with the Aquinas of the ScG: the operative grace of conversion which works internally from this second phase, and the exterior grace of providential circumstances for perseverance from the first phase. It is in turning to Augustine's third phase, from 426 on, against the so-called semi-Pelagians (Masillians), that we find the key insights which would lead Aquinas to the final changes found in the *Summa*. Augustine extends his understanding of one's predestination to conversion to encompass eternal life. Hence, the grace of conversion and perseverance are both subsumed under the category of predestination, thereby rendering them both operative and entirely

or *Theocentrism*? Translated by Matthew J. O'Connell (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1997). However, these works are very specialized in their scope, and did not prove as useful for our broad-sweeping purposes as the J. Patout Burns' historical survey with regard to the thematic developments of the late Augustine which Aquinas encountered in his discovery at Orvieto.

gratuitous. This final phase entails a deeper realization of the reality of sin, even after conversion; it maintains the view that grace is inward and transformational (in addition to God working through providence); and is seen in the causal context of God's predestining election. P. Burns uses three works in particular as the distinguishing markers of the three stages: (1) Stage One: *De diversis quaest*: characterized by external motives; (2) Stage Two: *Epistula 194 to Sextus*: characterized by conversion by internal grace and election; and (3) Stage Three: *De correptione et gratia*: combination of internal and external motives, election, and the operative grace of perseverance.²⁶ It is this final stage, which entails four main works, that concerns us. I shall examine each with a special attentiveness to the way in which he uses the Lord's Prayer²⁷ in connection with his teaching on perseverance.

(1) *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (426/427)

Augustine writes of this work in his *Revisions*,

I wrote a book whose title is *On Grace and Free Choice* because of those persons who, by thinking that free choice is denied when the grace of God is defended, defend free will in such a manner as to deny the grace of God by affirming that it is bestowed according to our merits. I addressed it, however, to those monks of Hadrumetum in whose monastery the controversy on this subject started; as a result, some of them were compelled to consult me.²⁸

²⁶ Cf. P. Burns, *Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace*, 7.

²⁷ One study in particular has been put forth on the way in which Augustine uses the Lord's Prayer: Jackson, M. G. St. A. "The Lord's Prayer in St. Augustine." Edited by Elizabeth A. Livingstone. *Studia Patristica* 27 (1993): 311-321. To my disappointment, however, this essay largely relied upon his early use of the Lord's Prayer, such as on his *Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount*, rather than his later use, thereby contextualizing it against a Neoplatonic background that was largely inapplicable to the investigation of this essay.

²⁸ Augustine, *The Retractions*. Volume 60 in *The Fathers of the Church Series*, Translated by Sister Mary Inez Bogan, RSM, PhD. (The Catholic University of America Press: Washing, DC, 1968) II, 65, 92.

This work could be divided into two broad parts: The first is the scriptural proof of the existence of free choice and of the necessity of divine grace;²⁹ and the second is an explanation of the doctrine of grace.³⁰ In this first section, after Augustine attempts to solicit the Scriptural witness regarding free will, he discusses the necessity of grace for our making good use of our free choice. In addition to its requirement for the practice of monastic chastity³¹ and marital chastity,³² it is especially needed for overcoming temptation.³³ Flowing from this discussion, Augustine makes the important claim, especially regarding its influence on the late Aquinas, that grace is needed in the three stages of Christian life: conversion,³⁴ for good works after conversion to the faith,³⁵ and in the recompense in accord with one's merits, though the merits of the saints are God's gifts.

²⁹ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*. Vol. I/26, in *Answer to the Pelagians, IV: To the Monks of Hadrumetum and Provence*, translated by SJ Roland J. Teske (New City Press: Hyde Park, NY, 1999) paragraphs 2-22. A structural outline, which is largely used here, can be found in the Introduction to this edition of Augustine's Anti-Pelagian works. The paragraph numbers referenced in this essay are those which have received currency in association with the referencing of this text, and which are implemented by R. Teske in this edition.

³⁰ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraphs 23-45. A structural outline, which is largely used here, can be found in the Introduction to the New City Press edition of Augustine's Anti-Pelagian works: *On Grace and Free Will*. Vol. I/26, in *Answer to the Pelagians, IV: To the Monks of Hadrumetum and Provence*, translated by SJ Roland J. Teske (New City Press: Hyde Park, NY, 1999).

³¹ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 7.

³² Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 8.

³³ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 9.

³⁴ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 10-12.

³⁵ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 13-14.

Augustine builds upon the theme of the necessity for grace in *all* stages of the Christian life, specifically in the post-conversion ones, in his second part which offers a summary explanation of his teaching on grace. He insists against the Pelagians that grace is not simply the forgiveness of sins, since we must pray daily not merely for the forgiveness of sins, but also that we may not be brought into temptation. The latter petition asks not for the grace of the forgiveness of past sins, but for the grace to avoid future sins.³⁶

They also say that the grace of God which was given through faith in Jesus Christ, which is neither the law nor nature, can only bring it about that past sins are forgiven, but not that we avoid future sins and overcome obstacles. But if this were true, after we said in the Lord's Prayer, *Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors*, we surely would not add, *And bring us not into temptation* (Mt 6:12-13). For we say the first petition in order that our sins may be forgiven, but the second petition in order that we may avoid or conquer sins. We should have no reason to ask this from the Father who is in heaven if we were able to do this by the power of the human will.³⁷

With regard to the question of how God is able to prevent us from future sins, viz. of divine agency and causality in the taxis of grace, Augustine maintains that on the basis of scripture God holds in his power human wills such that he not only changes bad wills into good wills (conversion), but directs good wills to good actions (perseverance). God produces in the hearts of human beings the very movement of their will toward the good.³⁸ It is in this respect that one can especially discern the defining features, as outlined by P. Burns, in this work.

(2) *De Correptione et Gratia* (426/427)

³⁶ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 26. I am indebted to R. Teske's well articulated summary for this concise rendition of the text's core argument, cf. page 15 of this edition.

³⁷ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Choice*, paragraph 26.

³⁸ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 45.

Having sent a previous work, *On Grace and Free Choice*, to the monks of Hadrumentum, an unnamed monk objected that the Augustinian doctrine of grace renders rebuke meaningless. In Augustine's own words in his *Retractions*, he writes: "A second time, to the same monks, I wrote a second book. I entitled it *On Admonition and Grace* because I had been told that some one there had said that no one should be admonished for not observing the commandments of God, but that prayer alone should be offered for him so that he would observe them."³⁹ In this work, Augustine not only responds to this objection, but builds upon further themes, of which the concept of perseverance stands at the foremost. Augustine's provocation for discussing perseverance was not directly occasioned by the discussion with these monks; rather, it seems that Augustine was bringing to fruition "intra-mural," as opposed to "extra-mural," factors, as it were, such as implicit assumptions and exegetical commitments in the spirit of "faith seeking understanding."

In this work, Augustine's references to perseverance are exponentially more frequent than in any previous work.⁴⁰ It is important that Augustine contextualizes his teaching on perseverance within two frameworks: (1) the reality of original sin; and (2) predestination. These parameters allow Augustine to simultaneously affirm that those who do not persevere have no

³⁹ Augustine, *The Retractions*, II, 66 (93).

⁴⁰ The following are all of the occurrences of perseverance in this work, referenced by paragraph number: ability and will to, 38; Adam's fall/failure, (10, 26), 34, 38; chosen brought to happy life, 16; chosen people, 35; faith that works through love, 13; final blessedness (12, 33); gift not received, 42; gift of God, 10, (8, 17); gift, to the end, 15, 16, 19, 23, (10, 26); holding on to the good, 32; in goodness, 36; mercy of God, 10; not given to all God's children, 18; predestination and, 10; predestined children, 21; standing with, 36; true children of God (9, 20); true disciples of Christ, 22; will and, (8, 17)

excuse, since they justly deserve damnation,⁴¹ and that predestination to eternal life is efficacious in the elected.⁴² This understanding of perseverance accentuates the distinction between this third of Burns' stages and the second in that the irresistibility of grace, the internal and transformative quality, and the contextualization in terms of original sin and predestination are all definitive underlying features. Since Augustine contextualizes perseverance in terms of one's attainment of God as final end,⁴³ he frames the question in terms of God's causality with respect to the wayfarer, rather than in terms of the wayfarer him- or herself. In the second half of the work, in which Augustine is distinguishing between the different graces of the first and second Adam, he posits the irresistibility and internal-aspect of grace in a new and refined way: he distinguishes between the help without which (*adjutorium sine quo*) we cannot do something, as was the case with Adam, and the help by which (*adjutorium quo*) we do something, as is the case with the saints.⁴⁴ The first of these is the sufficient but not necessary formulation of grace, the second is both sufficient and necessary such that when it is given God effectively moves the believer unto that end. The former provides a framework of potential, the latter of potential and actualization. Augustine then moves to use this distinction to contextualize the post-conversion wayfarer who is faced with the many temptations of life:

Against so many and such great temptations which did not exist in paradise, a greater freedom is, of course, needed, a freedom protected and strengthened by the gift of perseverance, in order that one may conquer this world along with all its loves, fears, and errors. The martyrdoms of the saints have shown this. Again, without any threat from anything and despite the command and threat of God, Adam used his free choice and did not remain standing in such great happiness with such a great facility for not sinning. But the saints have remained standing in

⁴¹ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 11.

⁴² Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 13.

⁴³ Cf. Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 19.

⁴⁴ Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 34.

the faith, though the world was, I do not say threatening them, but fiercely attacking them in order that they would not remain standing.⁴⁵

We can discern a certain pattern with regard to this understanding of perseverance: from the view of God's causality, it is entirely gratuitous and contextualized in terms of predestination and election, and is therefore irresistible, absolutely efficacious, and works through internal and external motivations. From the perspective of its effects on or role in the post-conversion life of the wayfarer, it always presumes a deep realization regarding the reality of sin and our susceptibility to temptation. Grace is entirely efficacious for those who have been chosen, and works internally, causing one to not only avoid temptation but to actualize good works from a good will (that is, one which has already been converted). Both of these purviews are consistently associated with the Lord's Prayer, especially since the latter is understood to disclose the situation of the wayfarer and the gratuity of the perseverance through the avoidance of temptation precisely because it is a petition in our prayer to God.

(3) De Praedestinatione Sanctorum (428-429)⁴⁶

The two works, *de praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *de dono perseverantiae*, were originally one work, which bore the title of the former, but have been treated as two works since about the ninth century.⁴⁷ Given the separation of these works, the main discussion of perseverance and the Lord's prayer is found in the second of these, since the central pre-

⁴⁵ Augustine, *Rebuke and Grace*, 35.

⁴⁶ For the dating of this work, see Augustin, *Aux moines d'Adrumete et de Provence*. Volume 24 in *Oeuvres de Saint Augustin*. Translated by J. Chene and J. Pintard (Institut D'Etudes Augustiniennes: Paris, 1962) 437, n. 1.

⁴⁷ Cf. General Introduction by Roland Teske in Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*. Vol. I/26, in *Answer to the Pelagians, IV: To the Monks of Hadrumetum and Provence*, translated by Roland J. Teske, SJ (New City Press: Hyde Park, NY, 1999) 21. [Henceforth, *De dono. Pers.* or *On the Predestination of the Saints*]

occupation of this work is the contextualization of the starting point of faith in terms of God's eternal predestination of the saints, rather than with one's own initiative. Against those monks who argued that grace is a recompense for the beginning of faith so that the initiative for one's salvation and even one's perseverance in grace up to the end of this life rests with each human being rather than with God,⁴⁸ Augustine defends three theses: (1) the gratuity of the starting point of faith; (2) that the grace to believe is not offered to all human beings; and (3) that grace is efficacious such that it not only enables one to believe, but moves one believe. Augustine, on account of his insistence on the utter gratuity of grace, argues that not even God's foreknowledge of how we *would* respond could prompt his giving of grace, since that would simply be to push the threshold of merit into a virtual future.⁴⁹ While this groundwork is relevant for his treatment of perseverance, on account of the scope of his argument in this portion of the text, the implications that it has for his treatment on perseverance do not come to their full realization until the second half of this work: *de dono perseverantiae*.

(4) *De Dono Perseverantiae* (428/429)

This second portion of the originally one work is the climax of Augustine's teaching on perseverance and the Lord's prayer. While the work is extensive and covers a broad span of issues, ranging from the question of prayer in relation to perseverance to the issue of God's foreknowledge in the process of divine election, the scope of this paper will limit our

⁴⁸ Cf. Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, General Introduction by Roland Teske, 25.

⁴⁹ Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, paragraphs 24-25, 38; It seems that in this regard Augustine largely anticipated the controversy on grace between the Jesuits (especially the Molinists) and the Dominicans, which would lead to the commission of Pope Clement VIII: "*scire mentem Augustini*," at the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* (1598-1607).

consideration to the first sixteen sections, wherein Augustine outlines his main teaching on perseverance and his understanding of the significance of the Lord's Prayer. Augustine begins by defining his understanding of perseverance:

We state, therefore, that the perseverance by which one perseveres in Christ up to the end is a gift of God. But I mean the end at which this life, in which alone there is danger that one might fall, comes to an end. And so, it is uncertain whether anyone has received this gift as long as he is living this life.⁵⁰

It is important to note that Augustine's understanding of perseverance is correlated with the divine *telos* for a person. This presupposes the overarching framework of predestination outlined in the last book, and the premise of the absolute and internal efficacy of grace, as is characteristic of this third of P. Burns' stages. Augustine argues that perseverance is always a gift from God,⁵¹ using the Prayer of Christians as proof for this claim:

But why do we ask for this perseverance from God if God does not give it? Or is this petition also a mockery when we ask from him what we know he does not give, but what lies in the power of a human being without God's giving it? ... Or do we perhaps not ask him for this perseverance? One who says this does not now need to be refuted by my arguments, but to be overwhelmed by the prayers of the saints. Or is there any of them who does not ask from God for himself that he may persevere in him? For, when the saints pray the very prayer which is called the Lord's, because the Lord taught it to them, they realize that they ask for almost nothing but perseverance?⁵²

This method of argumentation is important. Much like Athanasius' anti-Arian writings, Augustine uses worship as content for theological inquiry. *Why would we pray and ask for something that is in our own power? And, if we do in fact pray to God for this, then is it not*

⁵⁰ Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance*. Vol. 1/26, in *Answer to the Pelagians, IV: To the Monks of Hadrumetum and Provence*, translated by Roland J Teske, SJ (New City Press: Hyde Park, NY 1999) 1, 1.

⁵¹ Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, 2, 2.

⁵² Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, 2, 3.

entirely gratuitous? This argument is incredibly powerful, and although it is touched upon in some of his earlier writings, it is most evident in this work. Augustine posits that the Catholic faith especially defends three points against the Pelagians in this respect, the first two of which may be found in St. Cyprian's *On the Lord's Prayer*.⁵³

- (1) One of them is that the grace of God is not given according to our merits because all the merits of the righteous are also the gifts of God and conferred by the grace of God.
- (2) The second is that no one can live in this corruptible body without some sins, no matter how great one's righteousness is.
- (3) The third is that a human being is born subject to the sin of the first human being and bound by the chain of condemnation unless the guilt which is contracted by birth is removed by rebirth.

Augustine then turns to an exposition of the six petitions of the Lord's Prayer, positing that each – except the fifth – pray for the grace of perseverance:

First Petition: *Pater noster, qui es in caelis, sanctificetur Nomen Tuum* : Augustine cites St. Cyprian as supporting the position that “we ask of God perseverance in holiness, that is, that we may persevere in holiness when we say, *May you name be made holy*.”⁵⁴ To embrace this reading, Augustine contends, is to accept that perseverance itself is also a great gift of God by which the other gifts of God are preserved.⁵⁵

Second Petition: *adveniat Regnum Tuum*: For Augustine, the realization of the kingdom of God on earth is in and through the perseverance of the saints: “And so, here too what do those who are already holy pray for except that they may persevere in that holiness which has been

⁵³ Augustine, *The Gift of Perseverance*, 2, 4.

⁵⁴ Augustine, *The Gift of Perseverance*, 2, 4.

⁵⁵ Augustine, *The Gift of Perseverance*, 2, 4.

given to them? For otherwise the kingdom of God will not come to them, for it is certain that the kingdom of God will come, not to others, but to these persons who persevere up to the end.”⁵⁶

Third Petition: *fiat voluntas Tua, sicut in caelo, et in terra*: The actualization of the will of God on earth is also understood in terms of perseverance. Whether we pray for an increase of grace and perseverance in the faithful, or for the conversion of non-believers, we are praying that God’s will be fulfilled in this or these person(s) such that they will attain to God as end: “For no one attains that highest happiness which is found in the kingdom unless he perseveres to the end in that holiness which he acquired on earth.”⁵⁷

Fourth Petition: *Panem nostrum cotidianum da nobis hodie*: Augustine employs a citation from St. Cyprian⁵⁸ to interpret this quote in terms of perseverance: “These words of the holy man of God show that the saints certainly ask for perseverance from the Lord when they say, *Give us today our daily bread*, with the intention that they may not be separated from the body of Christ, but may remain in that holiness in which they commit no grace sin by which they would merit to be separated from him.”⁵⁹

Fifth Petition: *et dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris* : It is this petition alone, Augustine contends, that there is found no prayer for perseverance: “For the sins which we pray may be forgiven us are past, but perseverance which brings us to

⁵⁶ Augustine, *The Gift of Perseverance*, 2, 5

⁵⁷ Augustine, *The Gift of Perseverance*, 3, 6.

⁵⁸ St. Cyprian, *On the Lord’s Prayer*. Volume 36 in *Treatises*. The Fathers of the Church Series. Translated by Roy J. Deferrari (Fathers of the Church, Inc: New York, 1958) Chapter 18. This reference may also be found in the *Corpus Christianorum Latinorum* Volume 3A, 101.

⁵⁹ Augustine, *The Gift of Perseverance*, 4, 7.

salvation for eternity is not necessary for the period of this life which is already past, but for the time which remains up to the end.”⁶⁰

Sixth Petition: *et ne nos inducas in tentationem, sed libera nos a Malo*: Regarding this last petition, Augustine writes “But when holy persons say, *Bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil* (Mt 6:13), what else do they pray for but that they may persevere in holiness? For, after this gift of God has been granted to them, which is quite clearly shown to be a gift of God when they ask for it from him, after, I repeat, this gift of God has been granted to them so that they are not brought into temptation, none of the saints lacks perseverance in holiness up to the end. For no one ceases to persevere in the Christian way of life unless he is first brought into temptation. If, therefore, one receives what he prays for, namely, that he is not brought into temptation, he, of course, continues by a gift of God in the holiness which he received as a gift of God.”⁶¹

Augustine’s exegesis of the Lord’s Prayer seems to emphasize the all-encompassing character of perseverance, such that the entire Christian life after conversion and before death is guided by an attempt to ask for and actualize perseverance. Yet, while perseverance is to be sought within this lifetime, the predication of the term to any given sojourner can only be done retrospectively, since perseverance is always correlated with God as beatifying end, and therefore, only after a person’s death. We particularly see the above three points of the Catholic faith for which Augustine had argued conjugated and reflected in his exegesis of the Lord’s Prayer, thereby offering an integral and irrevocable connection and association between his teaching on perseverance and the Lord’s Prayer.

⁶⁰ Augustine, *The Gift of Perseverance*, 5, 8.

⁶¹ Augustine, *The Gift of Perseverance*, 5, 9.

IV. *Catena Aurea super Matt.*: post-discovery Aquinas (1)

As mentioned above, Aquinas discovered these last two Augustinian works on grace during his stay in Orvieto (1261-1265). While the *ScG* demonstrates a great amount of development from the *Scriptum*, this evolution seems to convey a greater degree of proximity to Augustine's teaching in the first two stages of P. Burns' study (especially regarding the externality of the grace of perseverance) rather than the third stage outlined above. Perhaps this is more indicative of the degree to which Thomas absorbed and appropriated these sources at that time, rather than his exposure to them. For, the *Catena Aurea*'s commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, which cites the *de dono perseverantiae* six times in his exposition of the Lord's Prayer, is reputed to have been offered to Pope Urban IV before his death on October 2, 1262, offering us a *terminus ante quem* for this discovery. We find a great degree of integration of these late Augustinian works in the *Catena*, especially when compared with his *Scriptum*, or even his *ScG*. The use of these works in the *Catena* as disclosing the close relationship between the Lord's Prayer and perseverance is notable. Aquinas relies heavily on Augustine's *Exposition on the Sermons on the Mount*, *Enchiridion*, *Letters*, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*.

The first three sources listed above do not discuss the grace of perseverance, and therefore, offer Aquinas a broader framework for exegesis than the specific dynamics of grace. The citations from the *de dono perseverantiae* were taken from Augustine's own exposition of the six petitions of the Lord's Prayer, each of which disclose the intimate connection between the grace of perseverance and the Lord's Prayer; in fact, in his exposition of the Lord's prayer, it is only with respect to the grace of perseverance taken from this late work of Augustine that the topic of grace is treated at all. With the exception of the fifth and half of sixth petitions, Aquinas cites Augustine as correlating the remaining petitions with his understanding of the grace of

perseverance. In the fifth petition, although like Augustine, he does not treat perseverance since forgiveness pertains to past sins, not current or future ones, he nonetheless cites this late Augustinian source to demonstrate that no one is blameless or truly righteous within this lifetime, and that all are in need of forgiveness (and hence, perseverance), thereby offering Thomas the wherewithal for a deeper understanding of the reality of sin, even after conversion.⁶² The other uses, of the first to fourth and sixth petitions, emphasize the teaching of perseverance outlined above in this late Augustinian work.⁶³ This attempted integration in the *Catena Aurea* discloses three important indicators of development:

⁶² *Fifth Petition: And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors:* Augustine, *De dono. Pers.*, 5., “With this weapon the Pelagian heretics received their deathblow, who are to say that a righteous man is free altogether from sin in this life, and that of such is at this present time composed a Church, *having neither spot nor wrinkle.*” ; ---, *Serm. in Mont.* ii., 8.; ---, *Enchir.*, 73.

⁶³ *First Petition: Our Father which art in Heaven, Hallowed be thy Name:* Augustine, *Serm. in Mont.*, ii. 4.; *Serm. in Mont.*, ii. 5.; *hallowed be thy name: de Don. Pers.*, 2 - “But why is this perseverance asked of God, if, as the Pelagians say, it is not given by God? Is it not a mocking petition to ask of God what we know is not given by Him, but is in the power of man himself to attain?”; *Second Petition: Thy Kingdom Come:* Augustine, *Serm. in Mont.*, ii. 6.; *Epist.* 130, 11; *De Don. Pers.*, 2: When they pray, *Let thy kingdom come*, what else do they pray for who are already holy, but that they may persevere in that holiness they now have given unto them? For no otherwise will the kingdom of God come, than as it is certain it will come to those that persevere unto the end; *Third Petition: Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven:* Augustine, *Serm. in Mont.*, ii. 6.; *De Don. Pers.*, 3: From this passage is clearly shewn against the Pelagians that the beginning of faith is God’s gift, when Holy Church prays for unbelievers that they may begin to have faith. Moreover, seeing it is down already in the Saints, why do they yet pray that it may be done, but that they pray that they may persevere in that they have begun to be?”; *Fourth Petition: Give us this day our daily bread:* Augustine, *Enchir.*, 115.; *De Don. Pers.*, 4 : Here then the saints ask for perseverance of God, when they pray that they not be separated from the body of Christ, but may abide in

- (1) that this work attests to his discovery and integration of these late works of Augustine in Thomas' thought.
- (2) that they reveal an identification of the grace of perseverance with the Lord's Prayer.
- (3) that such an identification, as indicative of the incorporation of these discoveries within the broader purview of Thomas' intellectual development and theological trajectory, helped Thomas (a) gain a deepened sense of sin and its effects; (b) transition to seeing grace as increasingly inward and transformational; and (c) have an increased reference to predestination (in a causal sense).

These seeds, as it were, come to their full maturation in his treatment of grace in the *Summa*.

V. *Summa*: post-discovery Aquinas (2)

that holiness, committing no crime.; *Serm. in Mont.*, ii. 7; *Epist.* 130, 11; *Serm. in Mont.*, ii. 7., *Epist.* 130, 6;

Fifth Petition: And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors: Augustine, *De dono Pers.*, 5: With this weapon the Pelagian heretics received their deathblow, who are to say that a righteous man is free altogether from sin in this life, and that of such is at this present time composed a Church, *having neither spot nor wrinkle.* ; *Serm. in Mont.*, ii. 8.; *Enchir.*, 73; *Sixth Petition: And lead us not into temptation:* Augustine, *Serm. in Mont.*, ii. 9; *Epist.* 130, 11; *De Don. Pers.*, 5.: When the Saints pray, *Lead us not into temptation*, what else do they pray for than that they may persevere in their sanctity. This once granted – and that it is God's gift this, that of Him we ask it, shews – none of the Saints but holds to the end his abiding holiness; for none ceases to hold on his Christian profession, till he be first overtaken of temptation. Therefore we seek not to be led into temptation that this may not happen to us; and if it does not happen, it is God that does not permit it to happen; for there is nothing done, but what He either does, or suffers to be done. He is therefore able to turn our wills from evil to good, to raise the fallen and to direct him into the way that is pleasing to Himself, to whom not in vain we plead, *Lead us not into temptation*. For whoso is not led into temptation of his own evil will, is free of all temptation; for, *each man is tempted of his own lust*. God would have us pray to Him that we may not be led into temptation, though He could have granted it without our prayer, that we might be kept in mind who it is from whom we receive all benefits. Let the Church therefore observe her daily prayers; she prays that the unbelieving may believe, therefore it is God that turns men to faith; she prays that the believers may persevere; God gives them perseverance even unto the end. *But deliver us from evil: Epist.* 130, 11; *Epist.* 130, 12; *Serm. in Mont.*, ii. 11.

By the time that Thomas had written the section of the *Summa* on grace in 1270-1271, he had a little more than half a decade to more fully consider the implications of these late Augustinian works, and to integrate them more masterfully.⁶⁴ This fuller integration was paralleled by a broader understanding of human willing and divine causality, the specific development of which is beyond the scope of this paper. Thomas' treatment of grace in the *Summa*, in I-II q. 109-114, reflects the convergence of several streams of development, among which his understanding of perseverance (along with conversion and merit) stands as one of the foremost. So deep did Augustine's *de dono perseventiae* affect Aquinas during his post-discovery years that by time of the *Summa*, the Lord's Prayer, when used for exposition of things pertaining to grace, was exclusively associated with perseverance. The two places in which it appears in the *Summa*, *quaestio* 109, a. 9c and 10 *contra*: "Whether One Who Has Already Obtained Grace, Can, of Himself and without Further Help of Grace, Do Good and Avoid Sin?" and "Whether Man Possessed of Grace Needs the Help of Grace in Order to Persevere?," respectively, are in two of the three places that Thomas treats the question of perseverance. These references disclose the prominence of the identification of the Lord's Prayer with perseverance; and the use of such an identification as helping Thomas to (a) gain a deepened

⁶⁴ Augustine is featured prominently in the *Summa*, more than any other Church Father. Except for noting that in the section on grace, Thomas cites the late Augustine's anti semi-pelagian writings, the following article's scope was too expansive to offer an specific contribution to this essay aside from the re-assurance of the importance and formative role that Augustine had with respect to Aquinas: cf. Elders, Leon. "Les citations de Saint Augustin dans la Somme Theologique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin." *Doctor Communis*, June 1987: 115-167.

sense of sin and its effects; (b) transition to seeing grace as increasingly inward and transformational; and (c) have an increased reference to predestination (in a causal sense).

The more difficult question, which could only be considered briefly, is whether or not, and if so how, this identification and subsequent three-fold realizations is reflected within the scope of his teaching of grace, specifically pertaining to perseverance in general. There are three realizations, as was just mentioned, that the late Augustinian writings provided Aquinas: (1) that perseverance is an unmerited and entirely gratuitous gift from God, without which one cannot attain to God as final end, thereby requiring the broader contextualizing framework of the predestination of the saints; (2) that God's grace not only enables the will to do good, but also brings good wills to do good, thereby working internally and transformationally (rather than through exterior circumstances);⁶⁵ (3) that temptation is a reality, even after conversion, in the face of which we need the grace of perseverance. These three Augustinian insights were incorporated into Aquinas' broader development regarding the effects of grace parsed in terms of causality (operative and co-operative) and the nature of human willing as conceived in the three-fold process of: (1) intention; (2) choice of means; and (3) execution.

The crux of the Thomistic innovation and synthesis of these different developments, as J. Wawrykow intimates, is *ST* I-II, q. 111, 2 c., which should serve as the hermeneutical key for understanding the rest of the treatise.⁶⁶ Aquinas offers us with the overarching twofold

⁶⁵ Cf. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, paragraph 45.

⁶⁶ J. Wawrykow, 'Perseverance' in *13th-Century Theology: the Augustinian Contribution*, 128. For a great analysis of Thomas' treatment of grace, see: Cf. Wawrykow, Joseph. *God's Grace & Human Action: 'Merit' in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas*; —. "Grace." In *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, edited by Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, 192-221 (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN 2005); —. "'Perseverance' in the 13th-

distinction of grace into the categories of *auxilium* (Divine help) and habitual grace. He then posits that each of these can be understood in terms of operating and co-operating. In the case where they are operating, God is moving the will to a certain end; in the cases of co-operation, God is moving the soul in such a way that the soul also moves itself. It is in this context that one may most profitably understand his first use of the Lord's Prayer. Thomas asks whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin? He answers that in order to live righteously humans need a twofold help from God: first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritorious of everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act.⁶⁷ Understood in term of its Augustinian predecessor, the distinction between habitual and *auxilium* seems to correspond to Augustine's distinction between the functions of "enabling" and "actualizing" with regard to grace. In those who are predestined, God not only enables them to act, but *makes them act*; he not only turns evil wills to good wills, but turns good will to good works.⁶⁸ This Augustinian insight has been absorbed into the Thomistic synthesis within the distinction between habitual and *auxilium*. This solves two problems for Thomas: the first is a metaphysical one, the second a moral one. Thomas offers two reasons why this grace is necessary:

First, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason – the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves *the law of sin*, Rom. vii. 25..... For which reason also it is becoming in those who have been born

Century Theology: the Augustinian Contribution." *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991): 125-141; —. *The Westminster Handbook to Thomas Aquinas* (Westminster John Knox Press: Louisville, KY 2005).

⁶⁷ *ST*, I-II, q. 109, 10 c.

⁶⁸ Cf. Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, paragraph 45.

again as sons of God, to say: *Lead us not into temptation*, and *Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven*, and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining to this.⁶⁹

It is in the context of attesting to the continual reality of sin, even for the converted, that Aquinas uses the Lord's Prayer. It is this Augustinian association of the Lord's Prayer as indicative of a deeper sense of sin and therefore need for perseverance as a gift from God that occasions his citation and use. Thomas further parses this out in terms of his refined understanding of human willing in the aforementioned threefold process. He is able to posit that the effects of grace understood in terms of operating would (1) turn one's intention towards God as beatifying end; then grace understood in terms of co-operating would enable and bring to actualization one's (2) choice of means, and (3) execution. Considered with regard to the Lord's Prayer, the deeper sensitivity to sin, and perseverance, the twofold requirement of avoiding temptation (*lead us not into temptation*) and actualizing good work in our lives (*Hallowed be Thy Name & Thy Kingdom Come, Thy Will be Done*), is parsed out in terms of this threefold understanding of the human will and bi-fold understanding of God's causality.

The two remaining questions pertaining to perseverance in his treatment in the *Summa*, the former of which occasions his second use of the Lord's Prayer, are "whether Man Possessed of Grace Needs the Help of Grace in Order to Persevere"⁷⁰ and "Whether a Man may Merit Perseverance".⁷¹ The first of these is asking regarding the nature of sin and the necessity of the grace of perseverance after one's conversion. Aquinas employs the Augustinian argument that,

⁶⁹ ST, I-II, q. 109, 9 c.

⁷⁰ ST, I-II, q. 109, 10.

⁷¹ ST, I-II, q. 114, 9.

given the reality of sin and our susceptibility to temptation, if perseverance were not a gift from God, then we would not pray for it:

On the Contrary, Augustine says (*De Persev. ii*): *Why is perseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking request to seek what we know He does not give, and what is in our power without His giving it?* Now perseverance is besought by even those who are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we say *Hallowed be Thy name*, which Augustine confirms by the words of Cyprian (*De Correp. et Grat. xii*). Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs perseverance to be given to him by God.⁷²

The potency of such an argument from worship, as with Augustine, cannot be overstated.

Perseverance here is largely understood in a twofold manner, the avoidance of temptation and the perseverance in good:

Perseverance is called the abiding in good to the end of life. And in order to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need another habitual grace, but he needs the Divine assistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the passions, as appears from the preceding article. And hence after anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he may be kept from evil till the end of his life. For to many grace is given to whom perseverance in grace is not given.⁷³

In light of the Augustinian development from external to internal motives, the question of the means by which perseverance occurs with regard to how God's causality interacts with the human will is answered in the very precept that *auxilium* moves the will to act, thereby bearing the imprint of the internal and transformational features of the late Augustine's view of grace.

The last section of Aquinas' treatment of perseverance, "Whether a Man may Merit Perseverance," pertains to the question of the gratuity of perseverance. Thomas argues that perseverance does not fall within the scope of human willing, but only within the Divine motion, which is the principle of all merit. As such, God freely bestows the good of perseverance on

⁷² ST, I-II, q. 109, 10 *contra*

⁷³ ST, I-II, q. 109, 10 c.

whomsoever he bestows it.⁷⁴ While it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a full account of his understanding of divine causality and the human will, it is noteworthy that through his response Thomas further incorporates two features of the late Augustine's writings: (1) that perseverance is entirely gratuitous and therefore cannot be merited; and (2) on account of its utter gratuity, it can only be contextualized in terms of the predestination of the saints. While he does not cite the Lord's Prayer in this last section, it seems evident that Thomas is asking these questions within the framework of an established network of association, of which late Augustine's works, the Lord's Prayer, and the operative grace of perseverance are all an integrally related part. It is only on account of the convergence between Thomas' work as an historian, systematician, and biblical exegete, in addition to his personal life of faith and worship, that one can find the crossroads of his rich network of associations that underlie such a fruitful synthesis.

⁷⁴ *ST*, I-II, q. 114, 9 c.